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“Who Gets the Dog?”: A Family Law
Approach
Jodi Lazare*
When families break down, the question of “who gets the dog” is often of fundamental importance
to the parties. However, Canadian courts have historically regarded companion animals as mere
property and ignored the emotional bonds between family members and their companion animals.
More recently, courts have taken a number of approaches, ranging from a traditional property analysis,
to one that considers the animal’s best interests. Given these developments, the author believes the time
is ripe for the law to adopt a more consistent and compassionate approach to the question of companion
animal ownership—one that reflects modern-day understandings of the relationships between humans
and nonhuman companion animals.
In this article, the author contends that Canadian courts should dispense with the traditional
property analysis to determining ownership of a companion animal, where purchaser equals owner
regardless of the dynamics in the home, and instead adopt a relational approach, which looks to the
roles and responsibilities of the parties in relation to their animal, regardless of legal ownership or title.
To explain the property-based approach, the author considers Henderson v Henderson and
Ireland v Ireland. These decisions illustrate how the traditional approach to determining companion
animal ownership ignores the meaningful relationships between humans and their companions by
focusing solely on the question of legal title. To illustrate an alternative approach, the author relies on
Rogers v Rogers, which considered the interests of the dog in question. The author then considers the
recent appellate decision Baker v Harmina, which set out a more nuanced analysis, and suggests that
the relational approach to determining companion animal ownership may be gaining momentum in
Canadian courts. This approach, seemingly at play in both the majority and dissenting reasons in Baker
v Harmina, explores the relationship between the parties and the animal to determine “who gets the
dog”, rather than only considering who purchased the animal.
The author concludes by noting that while there is no easy answer to who gets the dog in family
disputes, the relational approach—similar to the analysis that already underlies much of family law—
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provides the best means for court decisions to reflect the lived realities of the parties with respect to
companion animals. The author suggests that the relational approach, in addition to providing some
consistency in an otherwise unpredictable area of law, will help alleviate some of the perceived injustices
that surround treating companion animals as mere property by ensuring that relationships between
human parties and their companion animals are able to continue beyond family breakdown.
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Introduction
As the saying goes, pets are family. People who live with companion
animals—typically dogs and cats, but members of other species as well—
consider them their kin. Some might even “claim that their relationship with
their companion animals is their most meaningful one”.1 If dollars can be
taken as a proxy for their importance, in 2017, Canadians spent $8.3 billion
on companion animals, who live in more than 40% of households, nationally.2
Nevertheless, it is trite to say that the law does not grant companion animals the
same elevated status. In Anglo-American legal systems, nonhuman animals are
property—mere things, which may be disposed of according to their owners’
wishes,3 and the value of which rests solely in their market price. The property
designation does not, however, prevent people from treating their companion
animals as more than mere objects—providing them with expensive medical
care, sharing their homes (and often their beds) with them, and loving them
in a similar way as they do their children. But when families break down, and
their members cannot agree on what should happen to companion animals in
the family, the property status of companion animals becomes stark,4 as does

1.  Maneesha Deckha, “Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals” (2015) 27:1 CJWL 47 at 51.
2.  See Elizabeth Renzetti, “Is the Era of ‘Human Supremacy’ Coming to an End? For the Sake
of Our Future, I Hope So”, The Globe and Mail (20 July 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/opinion/article-is-the-era-of-human-supremacy-coming-to-an-end-for-the-sake-of-our/>.
3.  This is subject to the applicable laws governing animal cruelty. See e.g. Criminal Code, RSC
1985, c C-46, s 445.1; Animal Protection Act, SNS 2018, c 21.
4.  Increasingly, as will be discussed below, decisions in Canada, the United States, and other
common law jurisdictions import principles of family law, specifically, those governing child
custody and access, into determinations of companion animal ownership. In doing so, courts
nevertheless remind us that animals are property. Indeed, whatever language or principles one
relies one to determine companion animal ownership, the uncontroverted fact remains that at
present, animals are property at law, both in Canada and elsewhere.
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the “growing gulf between the self-understandings of average citizens and the
rules of the law”.5
When it comes to the family dog in Canada, when owners part ways,6 there
are no custody determinations, no inquiries into the animal’s best interests,
and no doctrinal basis for ordering access, visitation, or financial support.
Rather, in Canadian courts, who gets the dog is typically determined by a
straightforward property analysis, where purchaser equals owner. With few
exceptions, and as unpalatable as this reality may be to people who share their
lives with canine companions, the law concerning the ownership and continued
care of companion animals has not kept pace with societal attitudes toward
them.7 Rather, at present, “[f ]amily law . . . devalues the human relationship
with companion animals”.8 Thus, the determination of companion animal
ownership upon family breakdown is an example of “a certain tension, when
the law does not in fact answer the needs arising from major social changes or
when social behavior and the sense of obligation generally felt towards legal
norms significantly differs from the behavior required by law”—what Yehezkel
Dror describes as a “lag” in the law.9
This article makes a case for change. It argues that the law should catch up
with social attitudes and behaviour toward companion animals. On the heels of
the first reported Canadian appellate court decision to weigh in on companion

5.  Will Kymlicka, “Social Membership: Animal Law Beyond the Property/Personhood
Impasse” (2017) 40:1 Dal LJ 123 at 136.
6.  I recognize that the language around companion animals is shifting and that terms such
as “guardian” or “carer” might better reflect the relationship between humans and companion
animals than “owner”. See e.g. Maneesha Deckha, “Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric
Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law and Animal Vulnerability Under a Property Paradigm” (2013)
50:4 Alta L Rev 783 (on American legislative amendments changing the terminology from
owner to guardian—a recognition of companion animals’ “social status” at 791) [Deckha,
“Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence”]. Nevertheless, as similar changes have generally not
occurred in Canada, and because this article does not explicitly challenge the property paradigm
governing companion animals and its focus is determining ownership, I will use that term
throughout. Similarly, with the exception of direct quotations, I will use the word “ownership”
and not “guardianship” or “custody”.
7.  For ease of reading, and because the majority of relevant case law deals with canines, the
analysis will be primarily concerned with dogs. This should not be understood as excluding
members of other species typically kept as companions and family members from the application
of the ideas set out below.
8.  Maneesha Deckha, “Property on the Borderline: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal
Status of Animals in Canada and the United States” (2012) 20:2 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 313
at 333 [Deckha, “Property on the Borderline”].
9.  Yehezkel Dror, “Law and Social Change” (1959) 33:4 Tul L Rev 787 at 794.
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animal ownership following a breakup,10 this article sets out and argues in
favour of an alternative model—one that looks beyond who purchased an
animal and considers the relationship between dog and human and the way
that that relationship may give rise to unforeseen obligations. This is not a
radical proposition. In setting out its approach to determining ownership,
this article endorses the reasoning of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland
and Labrador, some of which relied on an earlier decision of the Small Claims
Court of Nova Scotia.11
Part I of this article reviews some of the relevant case law, as it has developed
in recent years. It sets out a spectrum of approaches that courts have adopted
in adjudicating disputes over companion animal ownership (the “ownership
spectrum”).12 At one end lies the traditional property analysis, which equates
ownership with the purchase of an animal and has little regard for the nuances
of animal ownership or the relational aspect of animal companionship. This
is the more frequent approach. At the other end lies what this article calls
the “relational approach”, which looks at factors other than who bought the
animal and reflects the idea that ownership of a companion animal involves
an ongoing and reciprocal relationship. Part II presents Baker v Harmina,
the 2018 decision from the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador
(Baker NLCA), which saw the Court split over the appropriate approach, while
nevertheless adopting relational reasoning throughout. Part III presents an
argument for the relational approach. It draws on family law concepts, as well
as relational legal theory, to suggest that the relational approach constitutes an
appropriate incremental shift in the relevant common law principles. Indeed,
given that domestication necessarily results in particular types of human-animal
relationships,13 relational theory is well-suited to addressing the legal treatment
of companion animals. Moreover, the relational approach aligns with popular
sentiment respecting companion animals.

10.  See Baker v Harmina, 2018 NLCA 15 [Baker NLCA].
11.  See MacDonald v Pearl, 2017 NSSM 5.
12.  Philip Epstein, in tracking the relevant cases, divides decisions into three different
categories: first, those in which “dogs are not a justiciable issue and the courts will decline to be
involved in resolving disputes over pets”; second, cases that “treat family pets as akin to children
and resolve the disputes based on the best interests of the pet”; and third, those that “accept that
family pets are property and [that] the ownership and possession thereof must be determined in
accordance with the law of property”. See Philip Epstein, “Epstein’s This Week in Family Law”,
Family Law Newsletter (28 November 2016) (WL Can) [Epstein, 28 November 2016]. As this
article argues in favour of a relational approach within the property paradigm, it adopts a less
categorical classification, with Epstein’s categories falling in different places along the spectrum.
13.  See Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 73.
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Literature on determining companion animal ownership is scant in
Canada.14 This article thus fills an important gap, given the growth of relevant
scholarship in other jurisdictions,15 and the attention that Canadian courts
have given the subject.16 Its objectives, however, are modest: to argue in favour
of a particular approach to a specific, and increasingly common,17 dispute—

14.  But see Kymlicka, supra note 5 (on the judicial determination of companion animal
ownership as an example of the erosion of nonhuman animals’ pure property status); Deckha,
“Property on the Borderline”, supra note 8 (comparing the history of treatment of companion
animals in Canada with the United States); Alain Roy, “Papa, Maman, Bébé et . . . Fido!
L’animal de compagnie en droit civil ou l’émergence d’un nouveau sujet de droit” (2003) 82:3
Can Bar Rev 791 (suggesting that through the use of legal fictions, the case law from civilian
jurisdictions, including Quebec—in both family law and the law of civil liability—might
illustrate the emergence of legal personality for companion animals).
15.  For scholarship from the United Kingdom, see e.g. Deborah Rook, “Who Gets Charlie?
The Emergence of Pet Custody Disputes in Family Law: Adapting Theoretical Tools from
Child Law” (2014) 28:2 Intl JL Pol’y & Family 177. For scholarship from the United States,
see e.g. John DeWitt Gregory, “Pet Custody: Distorting Language and the Law” (2010)
44:1 Fam LQ 35; Susan J Hankin, “Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of
Companion Animals” (2007) 4:2 Rutgers JL & Public Pol’y 314; Eric Kotloff, “All Dogs Go
to Heaven . . . Or Divorce Court: New Jersey Un‘Leashes’ a Subjective Value Consideration to
Resolve Pet Custody Litigation in Houseman v. Dare” (2010) 55:2 Vill L Rev 447; Christopher
D Seps, “Animal Law Evolution: Treating Pets as Persons in Tort and Custody Disputes”
(2010) 2010:4 U Ill L Rev 1339; Jessica Foxx, “The Use of Agreements in the Resolution of
Pet Custody Disputes” (2017) 85:2 UMKC L Rev 455; Kayla A Bernays, “We’ve Still Got
Feelings: Re-Presenting Pets as Sentient Property” (2018) 60:2 Ariz L Rev 485. For scholarship
from Australia, see e.g. Tony Bogdanoski, “The Marriage of Family Law and Animal Rights:
How Should Australian Family Law Approach the Rise of ‘Pet Custody’ Disputes?” (2006) 31:4
Alternative LJ 216; Paula Hallam, “Dogs and Divorce: Chattels or Children? – Or Somewhere
In-Between?” (2014–15) 17 Southern Cross UL Rev 97.
16.  Note that the survey of the case law does not look at Quebec, where the Civil Code of
Québec was recently amended to provide: “Animals are not things. They are sentient beings and
have biological needs.” See art 898.1 para 1 CCQ. See also Martine Lachance, “Le nouveau
statut juridique de l’animal au Québec” (2018) 120:2 R du N 333. Further research is needed
to determine whether the amendment has had a concrete impact on the law’s treatment of
companion animals where their ownership is in dispute following family breakdown.
17.  On the frequency with which this question arises, see Rook, supra note 15 (“[a] survey
in 2011 in the UK revealed that 20 per cent of separating couples with pets have sought legal
advice and fought for custody of their pet when their relationship broke down” at 178). Data
from Canada are not readily available but given the number of reported cases dealing with
companion ownership it stands to reason that the numbers would be similar.
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an approach that has already been endorsed by members of the Canadian
judiciary. As such, this article does not weigh in on the popular debate in
animal law (and, more specifically, animal rights) between the appropriate
legal classification of nonhumans,18 which, at times, does not acknowledge the
“diverse forms of human-animal relations”.19 Moreover, it is worth being express
about the fact that this article works within the current property paradigm
governing animals, an approach that some scholars believe currently grounds
“the most valuable successes for animals”.20 By advancing a practical and
achievable solution to the growing problem of determining companion animal
ownership on family breakdown, this article avoids common critiques about the
desirability and benefits of the pursuit of animal rights.21 But while it accepts
the property paradigm, this article does not constitute an endorsement of the
property designation of nonhuman animals.22 Instead, this article aligns with
Will Kymlicka’s social recognition theory, according to which, law is already
beginning to reflect social attitudes toward companion animals as community
members23 and as drivers of human relationships,24 as well as Angela Fernandez’s
18.  See e.g. Steven M Wise, “Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project” (2010)
17:1 Animal L 1; Angela Fernandez, “Not Quite Property, Not Quite Persons: A ‘Quasi’
Approach for Nonhuman Animals” (2019) 5:1 Can J Comparative & Contemporary L 155;
David Favre, “Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System” (2010)
93:3 Marq L Rev 1021.
19.  Donaldson & Kymlicka, supra note 13 at 65.
20.  Gregory, supra note 15 at 59, citing Bruce A Wagman, Sonia S Waisman & Pamela D
Frasch, eds, Animal Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press,
2010) at 51. See also Fernandez, supra note 18 (for the idea that familiar legal categories may
gain more traction with courts).
21.  See generally Jonathan R Lovvorn, “Animal Law in Action: The Law, Public Perception,
and the Limits of Animal Rights Theory as a Basis for Legal Reform” (2006) 12:2 Animal L
133 (referring to the pursuit of legal personhood for animals as “an intellectual indulgence
and a vice for animal lawyers to concern ourselves with the advancement of such impractical
theories” at 139).
22.  To be clear, this article should not be read as accepting of the status of nonhuman animals
as mere objects, or “legal things”. See Visa Kurki, “Animals, Slaves, and Corporations: Analyzing
Legal Thinghood” (2017) 18:5 German LJ 1069 (defining “things” as entities that “do not hold
rights and exist merely for persons to use” at 1070). Rather, I am of the view that the content
of the terms legal thing and “legal person” can adapt to reflect changing social and scientific
contexts. Moreover, like Kurki, I am open to the view that there is a possible middle ground
between property and personhood where animals are concerned. See Kurki, supra note 22 at
1086. See also Fernandez, supra note 18; Kymlicka, supra note 5; Favre, supra note 18.
23.  See Kymlicka, supra note 5.
24.  See Donaldson & Kymlicka, supra note 13 at 115.
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“quasi-approach” to nonhuman animals, which encompasses principles of both
property and personhood.25 In short, by encouraging the adoption of a theory
that takes into account the central role of relationships in devising legal policy,26
this article merely extends the application of the relational approach already at
work in family law.

I. Companion Animals and Family Breakdown: Two
Poles
This part sets out the competing judicial approaches to adjudicating disputes
between separating couples around ownership of the family dog. It does not
canvass every decision on the subject; litigation surrounding ownership of
companion animals seems to be on the rise in Canada and many of the relevant
cases have been documented by others.27 Instead, it focuses on examples at each
end of the ownership spectrum, thus providing the necessary background to
the 2018 Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador decision.
A. The Traditional Property Approach
Arguably the strongest rebuke of litigating companion animal ownership,
the decision in Ireland v Ireland, from the Court of Queen’s Bench for
Saskatchewan, provides a clear example of the traditional property approach.28
In Ireland, the divorcing parties were able to resolve all their issues respecting
family property without recourse to the courts, save for possession of Kadi,
a chocolate Labrador. Justice Zarzeczny presided over a one-day trial dealing
with: “1. Whether the court should rule at all with respect to the ownership
and possession of the dog, Kadi; [and] 2. If the court proceeds to do so,
what arrangement or disposition of the ownership and possession of Kadi is
appropriate?”29 The former question, as framed by the justice, provides a telling
indication of the reasoning to follow. Indeed, despite the acknowledgement
that Kadi is family property, pursuant to the relevant statute,30 Zarzeczny J did
25.  See Fernandez, supra note 18.
26.  See e.g. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
27.  See e.g. Kymlicka, supra note 5 at 137–38; Deckha, “Property on the Borderline”, supra
note 8 at 337–46.
28.  2010 SKQB 454.
29.  Ibid at para 7.
30.  See The Family Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, s 2, online: <publications.saskatchewan.
ca/#/products/535>. See also Ireland v Ireland, supra note 28 at para 8.
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not take for granted that the latter question was one worthy of the court’s time.
Rather, under the heading “Inappropriate Issue to Try”, he wrote:
It is an unacceptable waste of these parties’ financial resources,
the time and abilities of their two very experienced and capable
legal counsel and most importantly the public resource of this
Court that a dispute of this kind should occupy all in a oneday trial . . .. It is demeaning for the court and legal counsel
to have these parties call upon these legal and court resources
because they are unable to settle, what most would agree, is
an issue unworthy of this expenditure of time, money and
public resources.
Except in the most compelling of circumstances (perhaps to
avoid a breach of the peace or potential harm that parties may
do to one another), the court should not be engaged with
interim applications or the trial of an issue such as this.31
Justice Zarzeczny went on to state that “a dog is a dog” and that principles
that might apply to “the determination of custody of children are completely
inapplicable to the disposition of a pet as family property. Any temptation to
draw parallels between the court’s approach in this case to the principles applied
to settle child custody disputes must be rejected.”32 Further, he warned that “[i]t
is not the intention of the court, in making an adjudication upon this issue, to
establish any principles at all for fear that by doing so the court may be seen to
invite future applications or trials to deal with disputed claims to family pets
as property.”33 Justice Zarzeczny went on to award ownership to Diane Ireland,
the wife, because, among other considerations, it was on her initiative that the
couple acquired Kadi and she spent more time on Kadi’s training and care, and
because a continuation of “shared possession” would be unworkable given Ms.
Ireland’s plans to retire and spend extended periods of time in the southern
United States.34
A later decision of the same court took a similar approach. In Henderson v
Henderson, Danyliuk J dealt with an application for interim possession of the
family dogs, Kenya and Willow.35 Citing Zarzeczny J’s admonition in Ireland,
Danyliuk J refused to make an interim award on the application, as he “[did]
31.  Ireland v Ireland, supra note 28 at paras 9–10.
32.  Ibid at para 12.
33.  Ibid at para 13.
34.  Ibid at para 14.
35.  2016 SKQB 282.
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not want to encourage such interim or final applications regarding pets”.36
Moreover, Danyliuk J confirmed his colleague’s reasoning when he wrote:
The proposition at law that dogs are property and are to be
treated as such, and not as children are treated, is borne out by
a reasoned and dispassionate consideration of the differences
in how we treat dogs and children. A few examples should
suffice as illustration. In Canada, we tend not to purchase
our children from breeders. In turn, we tend not to breed our
children with other humans to ensure good bloodlines, nor do
we charge for such services. When our children are seriously
ill, we generally do not engage in an economic cost/benefit
analysis to see whether the children are to receive medical
treatment, receive nothing or even have their lives ended to
prevent suffering. When our children act improperly, even
seriously and violently so, we generally do not muzzle them
or even put them to death for repeated transgressions.37
Later, he reiterated the trivial nature of matters respecting ownership of
companion animals:
In the particular circumstances of this case, I am not disposed
to make an interim order of any description. I strongly
suspect these parties had other personal property, including
household goods. Am I to make an order that one party have
interim possession of (for example) the family butter knives
but, due to a deep attachment to both butter and those knives,
order that the other party have limited access to those knives
for 1.5 hours per week to butter his or her toast? A somewhat
ridiculous example, to be sure, but one that is raised in
response to what I see as a somewhat ridiculous application.38
Finally, Danyliuk J attempted to seal the fate of future applications dealing
with the same issue: “Simply put, I am not about to make what amounts to a
custody order pertaining to dogs. I will be more blunt than the court was in
Ireland, and state that this sort of application should not even be put before the
court.”39
36.  Ibid at para 45.
37.  Ibid at para 32.
38.  Ibid at para 44.
39.  Ibid at para 40.
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For Canadian family law expert Philip Epstein, Henderson constitutes “the
quintessential judgment about the issue of family pets, and in particular, dogs”.40
In his view, “it settles the law about dogs, demonstrates the wisdom of Solomon
as it relates to dogs”,41 and “is an essential road map for those that would engage
in these disputes or for those who would advise them”.42 What Henderson,
drawing as it does on Ireland, makes clear is that for a number of Canadian
judges, who owns the dog is not an issue worthy of the courts’ time, just as
adjudicating possession of certain types of property, whether or not a family
member is particularly attached to that property, would be “ridiculous”.43 It
also suggests that ownership of a companion animal is a binary question, with
a clear winner (the spouse granted ownership) and loser (the spouse denied
ownership). As such, in addition to not reflecting the true nature of companion
animals and our relationships with them, the traditional property law approach
to determining disputed ownership “can represent a power struggle between
the parties”.44 Moreover, this kind of approach aligns with the individualistic
approach to property ownership associated with the general liberalism at play
in common law systems.45 More about this will be said below.
B. The Relational Approach
Decisions like Ireland and Henderson bear out the observation by Heather
Conway and Philip Girard that the common law tends to “privilege ‘property’
over ‘family’”.46 While that may have been true historically, the same authors
have written that certain kinds of property, like the family home, may connote “a

40.  Epstein, 28 November 2016, supra note 12.
41.  Ibid. This is in reference to Danyliuk J’s statement that “if the court cannot reach a
decision on where the dogs go, it is open to the court under the legislation to order them sold
and the proceeds split – something I am sure neither party wants”. See Henderson v Henderson,
supra note 35 at para 41.
42.  Epstein, 28 November 2016, supra note 12.
43.  Henderson v Henderson, supra note 35 at para 44.
44.  Bogdanoski, supra note 15 at 218.
45.  See e.g. Brenda Cossman, “A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender
Equality” (1990) 28:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 303 (relational theory provides a counterpoint to
the “individualistic and atomistic” view of liberalism at 332); Rosanna Langer, “Post Marital
Support Discourse, Discretion, and Male Dominance” (1994) 12:1 Can J Fam L 67 (on the
connection between liberal thought and the ethic of individualism and self-sufficiency).
46.  Heather Conway & Philip Girard, “‘No Place Like Home’: The Search for a Legal
Framework for Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain” (2005) 30:2 Queen’s
LJ 715 at 719.
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sense of place and even of identity”.47 The same, of course, might be said of
people who share their lives with companion animals. Certainly, and even
Danyliuk J would agree, dogs “are our constant and faithful companions” and
“[m]any dogs are treated as members of the family with whom they live.”48
This simple recognition of the companionship and family status of companion
animals means that they too are wrapped up in people’s identities. The legal
status of companion animals, then, might better be seen as aligning with John
Dewar’s suggestion that there has been a “familializing” of the general law of
property.49 While Dewar is referring to the family home, the same might be
said of the law respecting ownership of companion animals. Indeed, even if
the decision in Ireland dismisses the importance of the issue, Zarzeczny J’s
ultimate conclusion still depended on the relational aspect of companion
animal ownership; one of the reasons he awarded ownership to Ms. Ireland was
that “Kadi’s companionship is more important to Diane than it is to David”.50
While described by Epstein as “quintessential”,51 these decisions do not tell
the whole story. Whereas Ireland and Henderson sit at one end of the ownership
spectrum, other decisions might be viewed as sitting at the opposite end.
Indeed, as early as 1980, Canadian courts recognized that companion animals
are a unique form of property, and that a straightforward property analysis
is ill-suited to adjudicating ownership disputes. Rogers v Rogers dealt with an
application for exclusive possession of a “black Labrador Retriever registered as
‘Kareen Rhadamanthus’ and commonly known as ‘Daman’”, purchased by the
parties 2.5 years prior to their divorce.52 Judge Vannini, of the District Court
of Ontario, began his reasons with a reminder that it is “beyond question” that
a dog is a personal chattel, and therefore subject to the principles governing
possession of family assets.53 Further, like his colleagues in Saskatchewan,
Vannini J wrote that the “prime consideration” was not “the welfare or the
best interests of the animal having regard to the conduct of and to the wishes
of the spouses as in the case involving the custody of children”, but rather, was
47.  Ibid at 716.
48.  Henderson v Henderson, supra note 35 at para 1.
49.  John Dewar, “Land, Law, and the Family Home” in Susan Bright & John Dewar, eds,
Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008) 327 at 330.
See Conway & Girard, supra note 46 at 720 (citing Dewar). See also Andrew Hayward,
“‘Family Property’ and the Process of ‘Familialisation’ of Property Law” (2012) 24:3 Child &
Family LQ 284.
50.  Ireland v Ireland, supra note 28 at para 14.
51.  Epstein, 28 November 2016, supra note 12 (referring specifically to Henderson).
52.  [1980] OJ No 2229 (QL) at para 5, 1980 CarswellOnt 2449 (WL Can) (Dist Ct).
53.  Ibid at para 18. See also Craig Simmonds v Deanne Simmonds, 2005 NLUFC 10 (finding
that the family dog is a matrimonial asset).
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“the preservation of the animal as a chattel as with any work of art, antique
piece of furniture or heirloom that the spouses wish to keep, preserve and enjoy
solely or jointly with the other”.54 Where Rogers differs from the other cases is
in Vannini J’s acknowledgement of the unique qualities of companion animals,
as compared with other types of property:
In holding that the best interest of the dog is not the prime
consideration, I am mindful that a dog has feelings, is capable
of affection, needs to be shown affection and that its affection
can be alienated; that its needs must be provided for and that,
generally, it must be treated humanely and with all due care
and attention to its needs and that these factors are to be
considered as well in determining the right to possession or
access thereto.
Such feelings and such affection by a dog are evidenced by his
reaction to a particular person, by his bark, and or by his tail
and by other means as well.55
Mindful of these principles, the Court awarded ownership to the husband,
Robert Rogers, so that Daman could continue to receive proper training, and
benefit from both Mr. Rogers’ large property, near “a large park and bush area”
(the wife, Mary Rogers, lived in a small apartment), and his parents’ willingness
to look after the dog and provide the company of another dog while Mr.
Rogers was at work.56 The contrast with the Saskatchewan cases, which made
no mention of the interests of the dogs in question, is clear. But Rogers goes
further. In addition to vesting ownership of Daman in the husband, Vannini
J awarded a right to access and to intermittent possession to Ms. Rogers on
alternating weekends and a regular weeknight.57 The visitation order appeared
to be grounded in Ms. Rogers’ love for Daman, as well as the fact that granting
interim access would not “alienate him in his affection for the husband”.58

54.  Rogers v Rogers, supra note 52 at para 26.
55.  Ibid at paras 28–29.
56.  Ibid at para 21.
57.  This is a typical access schedule for children.
58.  Rogers v Rogers, supra note 52 at para 30. While it is impossible to know precisely what Vannini
J had in mind here, use of the word “alienate” might refer to the family law phenomenon of “parental
alienation”, which is understood as “the rejection of a parent as a result of negative influence
of the aligned parent”, and strongly condemned by courts. See Nicholas Bala, Suzanne Hunt
& Carolyn McCarney, “Parental Alienation: Canadian Court Cases 1989–2008” (2010) 48:1
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Rogers demonstrates that despite the analyses in cases like Ireland and
Henderson, the property status of animals has not been a hindrance to applying
relational considerations to determining companion animal ownership. At
the same time, the fact that courts have rendered decisions at each end of
the spectrum suggests that, for decades, the law governing determinations of
companion animal ownership has been far from certain,59 and that placing
the issue in front of a judge may represent an unacceptable level of risk to
companion animal owners.60 In 2018, the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland
and Labrador had the opportunity to clarify the situation, but the split decision
in Baker NLCA means that the uncertainty persists. Nevertheless, the adoption
of the relational approach by the justices in Baker NLCA, according to which
the dynamics of a relationship, or relationships, might result in a change to
legal ownership, suggests that the relational approach may be gaining traction
among the judiciary. Before arguing in Part III that the reasoning in Baker
NLCA should be adopted, Part II briefly explains the decision.

II. Baker v Harmina: An Appellate Court Pronounces
In 2018, the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador issued the
first reported appellate decision on companion animal ownership following
the breakdown of a conjugal relationship.61 For Epstein, the decision merits
high praise: “[the justices] not only considered an appeal from the Supreme
Court trial decision about the ownership of a dog, they expended considerable
time, energy and erudition in exploring, comprehensively, the law related to
ownership of dogs.”62 For the purposes of this article, in addition to taking the

Fam Ct Rev 164 at 165. Incorporating a controversial family law concept into a determination
of companion animal ownership would be an unusual move by the Canadian judiciary, but one
that would drive home the uniquely important status of companion animals in the family unit.
59.  See e.g. Brown v Larochelle, 2017 BCPC 115; MacLean-Beaudet v Belanger, 2012 CanLII
97365, [2012] OJ No 497 (QL) (Ont Sm Cl Ct) (applying reasoning from Rogers v Rogers);
Warnica v Gering, 2004 CanLII 50065, [2004] OJ No 5396 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct); Kitchen v
MacDonald, 2012 BCPC 9 (applying more straightforward property principles).
60.  See Michael McKiernan, “Courts Not the Best Forum to Figure Out Pet Sharing”, Law
Times (18 June 2018), online: <www.lawtimesnews.com/practice-areas/family/courts-not-thebest-forum-to-figure-out-pet-sharing/263099>.
61.  See Baker NLCA, supra note 10.
62.  Philip Epstein, “Epstein’s This Week in Family Law”, Family Law Newsletter (2 April 2018)
(WL Can) [Epstein, 2 April 2018].
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issue seriously, the decision merits attention for the way that it encapsulates,
both in the majority and in the dissenting reasons, the relational approach to
determining companion animal ownership.
Mya was the dog at the centre of the dispute. A cross between a Bernese
Mountain Dog and a Poodle, Mya was acquired from a breeder by David Baker,
during his relationship with Kelsey Harmina, two months before the couple
moved in together.63 In late 2014, when Mya arrived in Newfoundland, Mr.
Baker was frequently outside of St. John’s, working in Alberta, and then on the
Burin Peninsula, for two out of every three weeks.64 When he was gone, Ms.
Harmina looked after Mya.65 When the couple lived together, Ms. Harmina
continued to spend more time than Mr. Baker caring for Mya.66 While the
evidence around payment for Mya was unclear, the trial judge accepted that
Mr. Baker made the arrangements with the breeder and that his name was on
the bill of sale, even though “Ms. Harmina signed for Mya as her owner and
took possession of her when she arrived in Newfoundland by air, and Mya
stayed with Ms. Harmina from that day forward with or without Mr. Baker,
including after they split up, until attempts were made to share Mya after
their separation.”67 In August 2016, the couple ended their relationship.68 In
November 2016, despite attempts to share Mya, animosity arose between the
parties, who took out peace bonds against each other.69
Mr. Baker sued Ms. Harmina in Small Claims Court, seeking an order that
Mya be returned to him.70 Relying on the bill of sale in Mr. Baker’s name as well
as his payment for Mya, Flynn J found, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr.
Baker was Mya’s legal owner.71 Moreover, the Small Claims Court dismissed the
argument that Mya was a gift from Mr. Baker to Ms. Harmina.72 Accordingly,
Flynn J ordered Mya’s return to Mr. Baker.73

63.  See Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at paras 1–3.
64.  See ibid at paras 2–4; Baker v Harmina, [2017] NJ No 156 (QL) (NL Sm Cl Ct) at para
2 [Baker Small Claims].
65.  See Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 2.
66.  See ibid at para 3.
67.  Ibid at para 53. See also Baker Small Claims, supra note 64 at para 2.
68.  See Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 4.
69.  See ibid.
70.  See Baker Small Claims, supra note 64 at para 1.
71.  See ibid at para 8.
72.  See ibid at para 9.
73.  See ibid at para 11.
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Ms. Harmina appealed the Small Claims Court decision to the Supreme
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, Trial Division.74 There,
[t]he appeal judge found that the small claims judge had erred
in deciding ownership without having regard to the full context
of the parties’ relationship. She concluded that the parties
owned Mya jointly and ordered that Mr. Baker should keep her
while he was in town and Ms. Harmina the rest of the time.75
In short, the Small Claims Court and the Supreme Court, Trial Division took
differing approaches to the considerations that go into determining ownership
of a companion animal. As White JA for the majority at the Court of Appeal
put it: “The small claims and appeal decisions present two different models of
how a court should determine pet ownership. The small claims judge’s approach
focuses on the chain of ownership and looks for discrete transactions where
ownership changed hands.”76 Mr. Baker bought and paid for Mya and did not
give or sell an interest in her to Ms. Harmina, “[s]o Mr. Baker remained the
sole owner.”77 In contrast,
[t]he appeal judge’s approach takes a broader look at the
relationship between the parties and the dog. Instead of
looking for a chain of ownership with clear moments of
transition, the appeal judge’s reasons emphasize that the
parties “picked out the dog together while dating”, that they
shared expenses, that Mya spent much of her time alone in
Ms. Harmina’s care.78
As the majority at the Court of Appeal observed, the facts of the case, and
the decisions of the lower courts, “seem to pit traditional legal doctrines against
social realities”.79 Whereas the Small Claims Court applied the “traditional
theory that property only changes hands through deliberate transactions”,
the decision on appeal “seems more sensitive to the way in which, over the
course of a romantic and domestic partnership, ‘my’ dog can become ‘our’ dog,
74.  The Supreme Court, Trial Division decision does not appear to be publicly reported.
Information on the Court’s reasoning is drawn from the reasons of the Court of Appeal. See
Baker v Harmina (2017), St. John’s 201701G1914 (NLSC (TD)) [unreported].
75.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 8.
76.  Ibid at para 13.
77.  Ibid.
78.  Ibid at para 15.
79.  Ibid at para 17.
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without any explicit moment of gift or purchase”.80 Indeed, this is precisely the
idea underlying the relational approach, and the same kind of thinking that has
been applied, in judgments and scholarship alike, to the conjugal relationship
itself and to the financial consequences of its breakdown.81 Before fleshing out
how these ideas might apply to ownership of companion animals, however, it is
worth breaking down the precise reasoning at the Court of Appeal.
Justice White wrote the majority decision in Baker NLCA on behalf
of himself and Harrington JA. While the majority ultimately rejected Ms.
Harmina’s claim for partial ownership of Mya, the reasons nevertheless hold
valuable messages for future litigants in similar circumstances. Importantly, the
decision can be seen as symbolizing a shift in values on the part of the judiciary,
as it confirms that contrary to the reasoning in Henderson and Ireland, detailed
above, the issue of companion animal ownership is no less worthy of courts’
time than any other. Referring to the time spent on the decision, Epstein writes:
“High praise indeed for the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal and
Justices White, Harrington and Hoegg J.J.A.”82 Further, by taking the time
to review the relevant case law, and reason through the number of ways Ms.
Harmina’s claim might have succeeded, the majority at last recognized that,
indeed, “courts do . . . on a day-to-day basis resolve property issues no matter
how trivial and all too frequently courts are called upon to deal with the issue of
contents as parties are unable to agree on how to divide their ‘stuff’”.83 Outcome
aside, then, the majority decision in Baker NLCA might be seen as representing
a much-needed evolution on the part of the judiciary, or at least some of its
members—a recognition that companion animals are not, in fact, like other
kinds of property and are worthy of judicial attention.
As mentioned, the majority upheld the decision of the Small Claims Court,
awarding exclusive ownership to Mr. Baker, based primarily on the fact that he
was Mya’s legal owner. But in coming to that conclusion, White JA signalled
that there may be ways, using existing family law principles, for a claim like Ms.
Harmina’s to succeed, even where title to an animal rests with the other party. If
a case like this were viewed as “a dispute about the fair division of assets among
unmarried partners”,84 a claimant in Ms. Harmina’s position might be awarded a
80.  Ibid.
81.  See Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420, 169 DLR (4th) 577; Robert Leckey,
“Relational Contract and Other Models of Marriage” (2002) 40:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 [Leckey,
“Relational Contract”]; Lucy-Ann Buckley, “Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the
Supreme Court of Canada” (2015) 29:2 Can J Fam L 251; Jodi Lazare, “The Spousal Support
Advisory Guidelines, Soft Law, and the Procedural Rule of Law” (2019) 31:2 CJWL 317.
82.  Epstein, 2 April 2018, supra note 62.
83.  Philip Epstein, “Epstein’s This Week in Family Law”, Family Law Newsletter (13 May
2014) (WL Can).
84.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 29.
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constructive trust.85 Indeed, pursuant to Kerr v Baranow,86 the leading Supreme
Court of Canada decision on the division of assets between unmarried, or
“common law”, conjugal partners, courts should “look broadly at the whole
picture through the lens of unjust enrichment. If one party is capturing an
undue share of assets, the court orders compensation; if one party is walking
away with individual assets that ought to be jointly owned, the court orders a
constructive trust.”87 For the majority, Ms. Harmina’s claim fit squarely within
that framework:
Mya was originally bought by Mr. Baker, but Ms. Harmina
cared for her, fed her, walked her, trained her, and gave her
affection. This work conferred a benefit on Mr. Baker at Ms.
Harmina’s expense. It is at least arguable that this constitutes
unjust enrichment and that the basic requirements for a
constructive trust are met.88
The majority declined to exercise its discretion to grant a constructive trust.
Justice White was loath to make an order requiring ongoing supervision,89
given the potential for “stress, heartache, wasted time, [and] legal fees” that
often accompanies such an order in the context of child custody and access.90
But the majority’s reasoning here suggests that the relational considerations that
go into a finding of unjust enrichment and constructive trust in the context
of cohabiting spouses, about which more will be said below, might also be
applicable in disputes over companion animals. It is worth here noting that the
majority was also of the view that a claim for unjust enrichment resulting in a
constructive trust could not be granted by the Small Claims Court, given its
nature as “an equitable remedy changing the ownership of personal property”,91
which may only be granted by a superior, or section 96, court.92 Accordingly, it
85.  See ibid at para 30.
86.  2011 SCC 10.
87.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 30.
88.  Ibid at para 31.
89.  See ibid at para 25.
90.  Ibid at para 24. While a constructive trust would not typically result in ongoing supervision
by the court, awarding joint ownership of a companion animal, through the mechanism of a
constructive trust, could mean a court will be subsequently called upon to ensure that ownership
is properly shared, just as a court might be asked to enforce an order respecting custody of and
access to a child.
91.  Ibid at para 33.
92.  See ibid at para 34, citing Reference Re Section 6 of the Family Relations Act (British
Columbia), [1982] 1 SCR 62, 131 DLR (3d) 257; Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict,
c 3, s 96, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.

304

(2020) 45:2 Queen’s LJ

remains an open question whether a proven claim for constructive trust relating
to a companion animal, properly brought in a superior court, might succeed—
and, following White JA’s reasoning here, it should. While not a victory, then,
for Ms. Harmina, the majority’s reasoning holds some promise for future
companion animal ownership disputes: in the correct forum, a claimant in Ms.
Harmina’s position might successfully argue unjust enrichment and be awarded
joint (or sole) ownership through the granting of a constructive trust. The real
potential in Baker NLCA, however, lies in the dissenting reasons of Hoegg JA.
Justice Hoegg’s reasoning is important for two reasons. In addition to the
framework she adopted for determining companion animal ownership, the
dissenting justice issued a strong rebuke of the kind of thinking that often
characterizes similar disputes. It is worth reproducing her powerful words on
this point in full:
I am disturbed by the notion that courts should not spend
their precious time and resources determining the ownership
of dogs. Litigation over the ownership and possession of dogs
is far from unknown to the courts, which is an indicator that
the ownership and possession of dogs is very meaningful
to people. In this regard, I emphasize the emotional bonds
between people and their dogs, and say that fair decisions
respecting the ownership and possession of dogs can be much
more important to litigants and to society than decisions
respecting the ownership of a piece of furniture or a few
dollars. Our civil and family courts are routinely engaged in
cases of which the spoils are a whole lot less than a family dog.
As a society we accept without question that our courts exist
to resolve disputes that parties cannot resolve themselves.
That is a hallmark of a just society and a justice system where
the rule of law governs. While I do not wish my remarks to
be interpreted as advocating or encouraging parties to litigate
the ownership and possession of their dogs, I say there is no
principled reason why people in a dispute over a dog cannot
avail of the courts for assistance in resolving such a dispute.93
Justice Hoegg was writing in dissent. But it is clear from her comments that,
as Epstein notes, “[w]e have come a long way from the time when some courts
took the position that the issue of the ownership of a pet is either not justiciable
or to be given scant court time and resources.”94 Indeed, the number of relevant

93.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 59.
94.  Epstein, 2 April 2018, supra note 62.
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court decisions, combined with the breadth of literature on companion animal
ownership, never mind the growing field of animal law more generally,95
symbolizes an important shift in legal attitudes toward companion animals—
one that is long overdue, given the societal attitudes referenced above. It is wellknown that the law is often slow to catch up with evolving social trends,96 but
the dissenting reasons in Baker NLCA might represent a long-awaited change.
From the outset, Hoegg JA acknowledged that companion animals are
not like other kinds of property: “Determining the ownership of family pets
when families break apart can be challenging. Ownership of a dog is more
complicated to decide than, say, a car, or a piece of furniture, for as my colleague
observes, it is not as though animate property, like a dog, is a divisible asset.”97
But Hoegg JA went further; unlike her colleagues on this appeal, and the judges
who decided similar cases before her, the dissenting justice focused directly on
the relationships at stake to bring new meaning to the idea that animals are not
the same as furniture:
But dogs are more than just animate. People form strong
emotional relationships with their dogs, and it cannot be
seriously argued otherwise. Dogs are possessive of traits
normally associated with people, like personality, affection,
loyalty, intelligence, the ability to communicate and follow
orders, and so on. As such, many people are bonded with
their dogs and suffer great grief when they lose them.
Accordingly, “who gets the dog?” can pose particular difficulty
for separating family members and for courts who come to
the assistance of family members when they cannot agree on
“who gets the dog”.98

95.  There are 24 law faculties in Canada, at least 11 of which offer courses relating to our legal
and ethical relationships with nonhuman animals. For example, the Peter A Allard School of
Law, the University of Alberta Faculty of Law, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the
McGill Faculty of Law, l’Université de Montréal Faculté de droit, and the Schulich School of
Law at Dalhousie University all offer courses on this topic. The progressive rise of the subject
across Canadian faculties might be taken as evidence of this social and legal shift.
96.  See Justice Kirby, “Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law” (1987) 1 Austl
J Fam L 196 (on the “tortoise of the law”, referring to the speed with which family law adapts,
compared to scientific and technological advances at 212). The same might be said about legal
amendments compared with social and cultural changes.
97.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 48.
98.  Ibid.
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For Hoegg JA, the question on appeal was a simple one: whether Mya was
jointly owned by the parties.99 And, contrary to the trial judge’s reasoning,
the factual finding that Mr. Baker paid for Mya did not alone determine
her ownership.100 Instead, ownership of Mya depended on the relationships
involved, and not merely on who paid for her.101
To determine the answer to the “more complex and nuanced question”
before her, Hoegg JA referred to a “non-exhaustive list of principles”.102 These
same principles, first set out in a 2017 Small Claims Court of Nova Scotia
decision,103 were relied on by the Supreme Court, Trial Division judge on
appeal. Among the principles, which include a reminder of the property status
of companion animals, are the following factors that a court might consider
when adjudicating a dispute over contested ownership:
i.

Whether the animal was owned or possessed by one of
the people prior to the beginning of their relationship;
ii. Any express or implied agreement as to ownership, made
either at the time the animal was acquired or after;
iii. The nature of the relationship between the people
contesting ownership at the time the animal was first
acquired;
iv. Who purchased or raised the animal;
v. Who exercised care and control of the animal;
vi. Who bore the burden of the care and comfort of the
animal;
vii. Who paid for the expenses of the animal’s upkeep;
viii. Whether a gift of the animal was made at any time by the
original owner to the other person;
ix. What happened to the animal after the relationship
between the contestants changed; and
x. Any other indicia of ownership, or evidence of any
agreements, relevant to the issue of who has or should
have ownership or both of the animal.104

99.  See ibid at para 49.
100.  See ibid at para 50.
101.  See ibid at para 52.
102.  Ibid.
103.  See MacDonald v Pearl, supra note 11 at para 25.
104.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 52, citing MacDonald v Pearl, supra note 11 at para
25.
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At their heart, these considerations amount to an instruction that trial
judges look past a bill of sale (or adoption contract) and instead examine the
relationships at play—both between the parties, and between the individual
parties and the animal in question. Further, the considerations recognize that
ownership may evolve during the course of a relationship, in ways sometimes
not anticipated upon the acquisition of a companion animal. Indeed, these
considerations suggest that the person who cared for, comforted, and paid
expenses related to an animal may, by virtue of their relationship with the
animal, have an equal claim to ownership as the person named in any contract.
Applying these factors, Hoegg JA determined that the evidence supported Ms.
Harmina’s joint ownership of Mya: the parties were in a relationship when Mya
was purchased; Mya consistently lived with Ms. Harmina, who provided for
Mya’s care and comfort when Mr. Baker was in town and when he was away for
work; and both parties were financially responsible for her.105 Thus, by failing
to consider the relevant evidence, the trial judge erred in awarding exclusive
ownership to Mr. Baker.106 The dissenting justice would have accordingly
ordered that the parties either agree on a mutually beneficial arrangement
to share Mya, or file the appropriate application in the Supreme Court, Trial
Division.107
Both sets of reasons in Baker NLCA encompass a relational approach to
determining ownership—that is, they recognize that relationships may give
rise to new legal obligations, or modify existing ones. The decision accordingly
contributes a much-needed change to the law respecting companion animals on
family breakdown. Indeed, the decision implicitly relies on the same theoretical
underpinning as a number of family law doctrines relative to the financial
consequences of separation and divorce. Moreover, both the majority—by
expressing dissatisfaction with the current state of the law—and the dissent—
by endorsing a novel approach to determining ownership—bear out Deborah
Rook’s observation, made in the context of the proliferation of similar cases in
the United Kingdom, that “we are currently on the verge of a shift in approach
in resolving pet custody disputes”.108 By bringing to light the relational
underpinnings of the family law principles relied on by both the majority and
the dissent in Baker NLCA, Part III of this article attempts to frame that shift in
familiar family law terms. The hope is that courts facing similar disputes might
be encouraged to adopt the same kind of relational reasoning.

105.  See Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 53.
106.  See ibid at paras 54, 56.
107.  See ibid at para 58.
108.  Rook, supra note 15 at 179.
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III. Grounding a Relational Theory of Companion
Animal Ownership in Family Law
This part places the reasons—both majority and dissenting—in Baker NLCA
within a relational framework and explains why expanding relational theory’s
family law applications to determining ownership of companion animals is
appropriate. This is not a first attempt to ground human relationships with
nonhumans in the relational context. Kymlicka, for example, maintains that
relational considerations are relevant to legal relationships with companion
animals.109 Sara Seck argues that relational theory has a role to play in governing
the relationship between humans and the natural world.110 And Maneesha
Deckha suggests that in some circumstances, the law already views companion
animals as “relational creatures”.111 Moreover, relational thinking already plays
a role where the financial consequences of family breakdown are concerned.
Indeed, the law of unjust enrichment and constructive trust for common law
spouses—the framework examined by the majority in Baker NLCA—is rooted
in the presumption that some interdependency is inevitable within sustained
conjugal relationships and that property can change hands as a result.112
Likewise, the law of matrimonial property division and spousal support
recognizes that the dynamics of conjugal relationships make unraveling spouses’
individual contributions during a relationship unnecessary, if not impossible.113

109.  See Kymlicka, supra note 5 at 135 (for the idea that in Kymlicka’s social membership
model of animal law, rights for animals would vary according to an animal’s relationship with
humans). See also Jennifer M Putney, “Relational Ecology: A Theoretical Framework for
Understanding the Human-Animal Bond” (2013) 40:4 J Sociology & Soc Welfare 57; Clare
Palmer, Animal Ethics in Context (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) at ch 5.
110.  See Sara L Seck, “Relational Law and the Reimagining of Tools for Environment and
Climate Justice” (2019) 31:1 CJWL 151.
111.  Deckha, “Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence”, supra note 6 at 791.
112.  See Kerr v Baranow, supra note 86 (this case discusses the law of unjust enrichment and
constructive trust for unmarried cohabitants; despite the general rhetoric of choice underlying
the Canadian approach to property division for common law spouses, in establishing the test
for a “joint family venture” in Kerr v Baranow, the Supreme Court of Canada inquired into
“how the parties actually lived their lives”, and eschewed a detailed accounting of individual
contributions at para 88). Lucy-Ann Buckley suggests that this represents a “more relational
approach”. See Buckley, supra note 81 at 274. See also Law Reform Commission of Nova
Scotia, Division of Family Property, Final Report (September 2017) (on interdependency in
common law relationships generally).
113.  For an example of the relational approach to the law of spousal support, see Bracklow
v Bracklow, supra note 81; Lazare, supra note 81. For a discussion of the connection between
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Rather, all three of these questions are best approached by relying on relational
considerations. Accordingly, incorporating relational theory into the companion
animal ownership question would represent a mere incremental expansion of
the common law as it relates to family matters.
Relational legal theory, at its most basic, maintains that identities are formed
through relationships. Jennifer Nedelsky writes: “[P]eople are not self-made.
We come into being in a social context that is literally constitutive of us.”114
Its focus is on the “social situation of the individual”.115 A feminist response to
the idea of the “bounded autonomous individual of liberal thought”, relational
theory shifts the focus “toward relationships among people and the material
world”.116 In the family law context, relational theory accounts for the fact
that individuals are “enmeshed in . . . connection[s] that sometimes give rise to
nonconsensual obligation”.117 This is as opposed to the “liberal conception of
the subject”, which sees the individual as “an autonomous, rational agent that
chooses its relationships and obligations through the instruments of private
property and contract”.118 Whereas liberalism views obligations as voluntarily
assumed, relational theory understands that responsibilities may be involuntary:
relational theorists “perceive interdependent relationships as generating, over
time, obligations in excess of those devised by contractual undertakings”.119
Relational models understand that “[f ]ar from being atomistic, independent
actors, humans are unavoidably interdependent and connected to others,
particularly in the family context.”120 Instead of focusing on the formal features
of a relationship, the relational approach responds to the question, “‘what is the
effect of being in relation?’”121 Given the centrality of relationships in matters of
marital contributions and family or matrimonial property (the language varies by jurisdiction),
see Nitya Duclos, “Breaking the Dependency Circle: The Family Law Act Reconsidered” (1987)
45:1 UT Fac L Rev 1.
114.  Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”
(1989) 1 Yale JL & Feminism 7 at 8.
115.  Buckley, supra note 81 at 253.
116.  Seck, supra note 110 at 153.
117.  Milton C Regan Jr, Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999) at 166. See also Lazare, supra note 81 at 323.
118.  Robert Leckey, “Contracting Claims and Family Feuds” (2007) 57:1 UTLJ 1 at 7
[Leckey, “Contracting Claims”].
119.  Ibid at 7.
120.  Buckley, supra note 81 at 259 [footnotes omitted].
121.  Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J Llewellyn, “Introduction” in Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer
J Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2012) 1 at 4. See also Buckley, supra note 81 at 261 (citing Downie and Llewellyn’s
work).
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companion animal ownership, it is hardly a stretch to look to relational theory
as the foundation for the appropriate framework for determining ownership at
the end of a conjugal relationship. Further, given the “porous boundaries” of
family law,122 it is flexible enough to extend to novel questions like companion
animal ownership, especially given that, as discussed above, many people
already consider their animals family.
As seen above, the traditional property approach to determining companion
animal ownership will vest ownership in the party with title to an animal.
Alternatively, where ownership is shared (because, say, an animal was jointly
purchased during a marriage), ownership will be awarded to the individual
party with the better claim to ongoing title. This approach, with its focus on
the individual, is rooted in the liberal perspective, with its emphasis on private
property and contract. Thus, companion animal ownership is yet another family
law site where the law must respond to the “permanent tension . . . between the
individual and the family unit”.123 The response lies in the relational approach
taken by the justices in Baker NLCA.
Although the majority and dissenting justices employed different legal
analyses, both sets of reasons ultimately rest on the idea that where conjugality
and family life are concerned, relationships can change and develop over
time, including relationships with companion animals. For the majority, Ms.
Harmina’s contributions to Mya’s upbringing and care, financially and inkind, unjustly enriched Mr. Baker; had the case proceeded through different
channels, Ms. Harmina would have had a claim to a constructive trust—that
is, title to Mya would have shifted from Mr. Baker alone to both him and Ms.
Harmina jointly. In other words, the law of unjust enrichment and constructive
trust in the conjugal context means that ownership of certain property, with
both its benefits and responsibilities, may evolve over time as a result of the
relationship, in ways unanticipated by the parties at its outset. This is precisely
what relational theory, in the context of marriage and its breakdown, dictates.
In the matrimonial context, Robert Leckey writes: “The marriage contract is
highly relational . . .. The letter of its obligations and exchanges cannot be set
out completely at the beginning . . . and the commitments made initially do
not, except in a vague, hortatory way, exhaust everything the parties expect to
occur within the relationship.”124 The content of the relationship, in other words,
“simply develops from the parties’ interactions during its life”.125 In Baker v
Harmina, the relevant relationship was not just between the parties, but between
each of them and Mya. And, as a result of the dynamics of the relationship,

122.  See Leckey, “Contracting Claims”, supra note 118 at 1.
123.  Leckey, “Relational Contract”, supra note 81 at 3.
124.  Ibid at 8.
125.  Ibid.
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Ms. Harmina was left with (perhaps unforeseen or unanticipated) obligations
toward Mya, in addition to the benefit of her continued companionship.
Recognition of the possibility that new obligations may arise out of intimate
relationships is not limited to scholarship. Dissenting in Nova Scotia (Attorney
General) v Walsh,126 L’Heureux-Dubé J reasoned that the obligations that flow
from the marriage relationship are not a consequence of any contract, explicit
or implied, between the spouses—that they are not the product of “some
bargained-for exchange”.127 Rather, the relationship changes over time. The
same dynamic was at play in the relationship at issue in Baker v Harmina. Ms.
Harmina assumed the bulk of the work of caring for Mya, despite the fact that
title to Mya—pursuant to a contract—belonged to Mr. Baker.
The law governing the division of matrimonial property makes this even
clearer. While details of what constitutes matrimonial property vary across
provincial borders, property division following marriage breakdown turns
on status, and not on titled ownership or original purchaser.128 Where the
matrimonial home is concerned, legal protections “recognize the uniquely
personal nature of the matrimonial home”.129 Accordingly, entitlement rests
even further from ownership, grounded as it is in the nature of the relationship
between the parties, and not in the individual spouses’ legal connection with the
property in question. What this article urges is that the same idea be extended
to companion animals. Just as the “state of title is basically irrelevant” to
determining entitlement of a matrimonial home following family breakdown,130
“who gets the dog” cannot be answered by looking only at legal title.
The same theoretical foundation grounds the common law of spousal
support, premised as it is on obligations that flow from the relationship, as
opposed to the fact of marriage itself.131 As Lucinda Ferguson explains, “[t]he
interpersonal rights and obligations that arise in intimate relationships . . . can
only be properly understood as stemming from the relationship as a whole, a
sum greater than the adding together of all of the individual decisions within
that relationship.”132 Granted, the relationship in question here may not have
126.  2002 SCC 83 (on the constitutionality of excluding unmarried cohabitants from
presumptive equal division of matrimonial property).
127.  Ibid at para 146.
128.  See e.g. Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3; Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5; Matrimonial
Property Act, RSNS 1989, c 275.
129.  Conway & Girard, supra note 46 at 722.
130.  Ibid at 724.
131.  See Bracklow v Bracklow, supra note 81.
132.  Lucinda Ferguson, “Family, Social Inequalities, and the Persuasive Force of Interpersonal
Obligation” (2008) 22:1 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 61 at 67. See also Leckey, “Relational Contract”,
supra note 81.
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been affected by the gendered social and structural aspects that give rise to
gendered economic inequalities upon family breakdown.133 But the relational
approach to family law problems is still useful for the way that it accounts for
the non-economic,134 as well as emotional,135 aspects of a relationship—a feature
that makes it well-suited to the relationship between human and companion
animal, which is rarely premised on economics.136
The dissenting reasons by Hoegg JA make these relational considerations even
more explicit. Factors such as “[w]ho exercised care and control of the animal”,
who cared for and comforted the animal, who paid the expenses associated with
the animal, and “[w]hat happened to the animal after the relationship between
the contestants changed” together constitute an inquiry into the nature of the
relationship between the parties and the dog in question.137 Moreover, the
dissenting reasons readily accepted that legal ownership can evolve according to
the result of that inquiry.
It is difficult to read Baker NLCA as anything other than an endorsement
of the application of relational family law ideas to the question of who owns
the dog. Indeed, the decision demonstrates that there is no principled reason
to limit the application of relational legal theory to relationships between
humans exclusively, especially given that the relationship between a person
and their companion animal does not end when a conjugal relationship breaks
down. The relational approach recognizes that just because one spouse may
have purchased the dog does not mean the other would not have developed
an equal or stronger emotional bond with the animal, as seemed to be the case
with Ms. Harmina and Mya. Indeed, this approach aligns with the suggestion
made in other jurisdictions that “courts should not overlook the non-financial
contributions of a party who may not have purchased or otherwise possessed
the pet before or after the relationship but nevertheless played a large role in
maintaining the pet”.138 It would also recognize and respond to the fact that
“pet custody disputes only arise because of this emotional bond”.139
133.  See e.g. Susan B Boyd, “Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? Women, Work,
and Family” (1996) 15 Windsor YB Access Just 161; Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds,
Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
134.  See Buckley, supra note 81 at 265; Leckey, “Relational Contract”, supra note 81 at 9.
135.  See Buckley, supra note 81 at 261, 265.
136.  To be sure, relationships with some companion animals, such as those bred and purchased
to be showed, might be measured according to economic value, but the majority of relationships
with domestic nonhuman animals are valuable primarily in terms of companionship.
137.  Baker NLCA, supra note 10 at para 52.
138.  Bogdanoski, supra note 15 at 218.
139.  Rook, supra note 15 at 179. This statement might be nuanced to account for situations,
described in note 137, where the animal in question actually holds significant economic value.
But the importance of the emotional bond remains relevant.
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The idea that one’s legal connection to a particular item of property should
depend on a person’s relationship with the property is not novel. To some degree,
existing property law principles already account for this idea. The Supreme
Court of Canada has recognized that a breach of contract related to a specific
property where the claimant has a unique relationship with that property—or,
is someone “‘to whom the land may have a peculiar and special value’”140—
will give rise to a remedy of specific performance, rather than monetary
damages, on the basis that the property cannot be readily replaced.141 In the
American context, Eric Kotloff suggests that the same approach that governs
possession or ownership of “sentimental property” can “[provide] an analytical
framework . . . that can be uniformly applied to all companion animal custody
cases.”142 Thus, grounding ownership of a companion animal in one’s unique
relationship with that animal represents an incremental extension of existing
legal principles,143 a straightforward move given that family law courts are
already well versed in adjudicating these types of subjective value claims.144
The Canadian law of torts provides additional support for the relational
approach to companion animal ownership. On more than one occasion, courts
have awarded damages for emotional trauma and mental distress related to
the loss of a companion animal.145 While acknowledging the property status
140.  Semelhago v Paramadevan, [1996] 2 SCR 415 at para 21, 136 DLR (4th) 1, citing
Adderley v Dixon (1824), 57 ER 239 at 240 (Ch).
141.  See Semelhago v Paramadevan, supra note 140 at paras 21–22. See also Cross Creek Timber
Traders v St John Terminals, 2002 NBQB 79 at para 181 (QB (TD)).
142.  Kotloff, supra note 15 at 468.
143.  Similar reasoning respecting companion animal ownership has already succeeded in the
United States. See e.g. Houseman v Dare, 405 NJ Super 538, 966 A (2d) 24 (App Div 2009)
[cited to NJ Super] (where the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division recognized
specific performance of an oral agreement respecting possession of a dog, following a breakup, to
be the appropriate remedy in recognition of the idea that “money damages cannot compensate
the injured party for the special subjective benefits he or she derives from possession”—in other
words, based on the relationship between the claimant and the dog at 543). On the subsequent
remand of Houseman v Dare, the trial court ordered from the bench that the couple would
share possession of the dog. See Gregory, supra note 15 at 64; Houseman v Dare, 2010 NJ Super
Unpub Lexis 2498, 2010 WL 4025584 (App Div). See also Rook, supra note 15 at 182; Kotloff,
supra note 15.
144.  See Kotloff, supra note 15 at 468. See also Bogdanoski, supra note 15 at 216.
145.  See e.g. Somerville v Malloy, [1999] OJ No 4208 (QL), 1999 CarswellOnt 3557 (WL
Can) (Sup Ct); Ferguson v Birchmount Boarding Kennels Ltd (2006), 79 OR (3d) 681, [2006]
OJ No 300 (QL) (Div Ct) [Ferguson Div Ct cited to OR], aff’g [2005] OJ No 3279 (QL), 2005
CarswellOnt 2940 (WL Can) (Sm Cl Ct) [Ferguson Sm Cl Ct cited to QL]; Arnold v Bekkers Pet
Care Inc, [2010] OJ No 2153 (QL), 2010 CarswellOnt 11118 (WL Can) (Sm Cl Ct) [Arnold
cited to QL]. See also Roy, supra note 14.
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of animals, these decisions recognize that companion animals are distinct
from other types of property—that damages might be grounded not merely
in reimbursing the costs of veterinary care or the acquisition of a new animal,
but also in the unique relationship between the plaintiff and the individual
animal. Indeed, in the words of Chapnik J of the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice, to characterize a dog “as just another consumer product . . . as a
general proposition is incorrect in law”.146 In that case, the Court went on to
uphold the trial judge’s award of damages for mental distress following the loss
of a dog named Harley, “[b]ased on the evidence of the plaintiffs’ relationship
with Harley and Harley’s unique abilities and nature”.147 More recently, in
the context of a similar claim for damages, Deputy Judge Lepsoe wrote of
the “profound relationship that a dog can have with a human” in awarding
damages in excess of “what . . . would be characterized as replacement loss”.148
Deckha describes these moves on the part of Canadian courts as “[adding]
a relational valuation of animals” previously lacking in other areas of law
governing animals.149 It is an incremental step to apply similar reasoning to
thinking about nonhuman animals in the context of family breakdown, given
the central role of relationships in family law.
The goal of this article is not to set out a concrete framework for the
application of a relational approach to resolving disputes around companion
animal ownership. The work of mapping out the contours of the approach is
for the courts. Such has been the case in other areas of family law, where courts
have used relational theory to interpret statutory directives so as to remain
faithful to the parties’ lived realties.150 As a starting point, however, it is worth
being clear that the model would not have the effect of changing the rules
of family law. For example, the relational approach to determining ownership
would not create presumptions; each case would continue to be decided on an
individual basis, taking into account the insights of relational theory and the
precise idea that “intimate relationships are in their nature fluid . . . [and] not
predictable”.151 Moreover, the arguments set out above do not purport to solve
the usual and well-documented problems with family law, such as the costs of

146.  Ferguson Div Ct, supra note 145 at para 20.
147.  Ferguson Sm Cl Ct, supra note 145 at para 47.
148.  Arnold, supra note 145 at para 68.
149.  Deckha, “Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence”, supra note 6 at 791. See also Deckha,
“Property on the Borderline”, supra note 8 at 328.
150.  See e.g. Bracklow v Bracklow, supra note 81; Leckey, “Relational Contract”, supra note 81.
151.  Jonathan Herring, Relational Autonomy and Family Law (Oxford, UK: Springer, 2014)
at 36.
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accessing justice,152 and the ever-present risk that a party might use a companion
animal as a bargaining chip in the context of negotiations, as some might
attempt to do where the custody and support of children are at issue.153 While
the acceptance by courts of a relational approach might help litigants evaluate
their chances of success in court, the fact remains that broad judicial discretion,
and the consequent unpredictability of litigation, has been and continues to be
a “[hallmark] of family law in Canada”.154
Nevertheless, in an area of law plagued by the inconsistency and
unpredictability described above, the jurisprudential adoption of a relational
approach might provide some needed certainty by helping parties (and, where
they are represented, their lawyers) predict the outcome of a dispute, whether
by examining the relational factors relied on by Hoegg JA, or by demonstrating
the creation of a constructive trust, grounded, as that remedy is, on the dynamics
of a given relationship. Indeed, as ownership, in accordance with the relational
approach, depends on each party’s particular relationship with the animal, the
approach may be especially useful where a couple adopted an animal together
during the relationship: where both parties have a meaningful relationship with
the animal, the constructive trust approach opens the door to continued shared
ownership, in recognition of each party’s respective contribution to the care of
the companion animal, thus enabling the maintenance and continuity of the
resulting bonds between the companion animal and each party. While it is not
a perfect solution, the relational approach might be seen as an improvement
over the current inconsistency and general unfairness at play where a party risks
being told that the relationship she built with the family dog—a relationship
that might have spanned several years—garners no legal recognition or
protection at all.
The relational approach to determining companion animal ownership
represents a functional approach to the law—that is, it considers and recognizes
“the realities of familial relationships”, rather than some other vision of life

152.  See e.g. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, Meaningful
Change for Family Justice: Beyond Wise Words (Final Report), by the Family Justice Working
Group (Ottawa: April 2013); Michael Saini, Rachel Birnbaum & Nicholas Bala, “Access to
Justice in Ontario’s Family Courts: The Parents’ Perspective” (2016) 37 Windsor Rev Legal Soc
Issues 1.
153.  See e.g. Robert H Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, “Facing the Dilemmas of Child
Custody” (2002) 10:1 Va J Soc Pol’y & L 54 (discussing some of the general issues surrounding
child custody determinations and, notably, the common fear that parents will use child custody
as a bargaining chip to reduce support obligations).
154.  Nicholas Bala, “Judicial Discretion and Family Law Reform in Canada” (1986) 5:1 Can
J Fam L 15 at 20.
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and relationships.155 It accordingly aligns with calls to take “functional” and
“contextual” factors into account in adjudicating family matters.156 Moreover,
the proposed approach fits squarely within the prevailing definition of family
law, which is primarily “a law of relationships”.157 At present, those relationships
are between people—“between adults inter se, between adults and children,
and between both adults and children and the State, as continually influenced
by social and demographic changes”.158 However, as this article attempts to
demonstrate, family law should encompass the relationships between humans
and their companion animals as well.

Conclusion
This article presents one piece of a complex problem: how cases dealing
with the ownership of a companion animal should be handled in court. It does
so by comparing the range of approaches courts have taken to the issue and by
suggesting that the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador’s nuanced
approach in Baker NLCA appropriately captures the relational approach to the
question. It then fleshes out the relational approach, as it has been applied to
other family law problems, and argues for its suitability for determining “who
gets the dog”.
The article should by no means be taken as the last word on this question,
given the limited amount of scholarship on the issue in Canada and the
questions it leaves out. For example, it has not engaged with the gendered
aspects of the question and the importance of taking seriously women’s
relationships with companion animals, given the demonstrated connection
between intimate partner violence and animal abuse.159 Nor does it weigh in
on the appropriateness of incorporating other family law doctrines, such as the
“best interests of the child”, into the companion animal ownership analysis.
While scholars have argued both in favour and against that approach in other
jurisdictions,160 there is room to explore the idea from a Canadian perspective.

155.  Nicholas Bala, “The Evolving Canadian Definition of the Family: Towards a Pluralistic
and Functional Approach” (1994) 8:3 Int’l JL & Fam 293 at 312.
156.  Ibid at 310.
157.  Frances Burton, Family Law (London, UK: Cavendish, 2003) at 3.
158.  Ibid.
159.  See Kerri Froc, “Pet Custody: No Laughing Matter When it Comes to Women’s Equality”,
National Magazine (3 January 2017), online: CBA/ABC National <www.nationalmagazine.ca/
Articles/January-2017/Pet-custody-No-laughing-matter-when-it-comes-to-wo.aspx>.
160.  See e.g. Rook, supra note 15; Gregory, supra note 15; Kotloff, supra note 15.
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Agreements regarding companion animal ownership on separation have also
garnered attention outside Canada.161 The merits and drawbacks of so-called
“pet-nups” should be explored in this jurisdiction as well. Finally, focused as
it is on common law developments, this article has not discussed the adoption
of statutory directives that require courts in some American jurisdictions
to consider a companion animal’s well-being in the context of disputed
ownership.162 This question, too, merits local reflection.
It is obvious that questions remain about how the law should deal with
companion animal ownership upon family breakdown. What is clear, however,
is the growing dissatisfaction with the current framework, which reflects neither
the science nor popular sentiment around animals. Indeed, in 2019, “there may
well be a consensus that a system of law in a civilized society should reflect
concern for the protection and welfare of nonhuman animals generally, including
companion animals or pets”.163 As Jessica Foxx notes: “The number of litigants
entering dissolution proceedings expecting to see an existing structure for pet
custody will only grow larger. It is society’s responsibility to demand . . . the
change they expect and desire.”164 The relational approach offers this change.
And while, as in much of family law, “there are no easy answers” to “who gets
the dog”,165 the relational approach would promote consistency and go some
way toward mitigating the unpredictability of ad hoc judicial approaches, which
may often depend on a particular judge’s sympathies. However, to borrow from
Epstein, until courts throughout the country adopt a uniform approach, be it
the relational approach encouraged here or some other appropriate framework,
“[p]ursuing these cases [in court] is barking up the wrong tree”.166
161.  See e.g. Foxx, supra note 15.
162.  See e.g. Alaska Stat § 25.24.160 (a)(5) (2019) (authorizing courts to take into
consideration the “well-being of the animal”); Cal Fam Code § 2605(b) (2019) (authorizing
courts in the context of marriage dissolution cases to take into consideration care of an animal
in determining ownership and to make interim orders regarding care of the animal pending
final determination of ownership); Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 Ill
Comp Stat § 5/503(n) (2019) (authorizing the parties to petition for the temporary allocation
for the responsibility of a jointly owned companion animal and mandating that in making this
order, the court “shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal”). See
Philip Epstein, “Epstein’s This Week in Family Law”, Family Law Newsletter (13 March 2017)
(WL Can). As Epstein has also noted, legal commentators suggest that California’s law makes
clear that companion animals are more than just property. See Philip Epstein, “Epstein’s This
Week in Family Law”, Family Law Newsletter (15 October 2018) (WL Can).
163.  Gregory, supra note 15 at 37.
164.  Foxx, supra note 15 at 476.
165.  Epstein, 2 April 2018, supra note 62.
166.  Epstein, 28 November 2016, supra note 12.
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